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1. INTRODUCTION
Both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,' members of the government have argued that the
concurrent resolution provision of the War Powers Resolution 2 is unconstitutional. 3
The concurrent resolution provision states:
[A]t any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or
specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the
Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.4
In Chadha the Court held that a similar legislative veto5 provision in the Im-
migration and Nationality Act was an unconstitutional attempt to alter the separation
of powers. 6 It has been argued that this decision invalidates the concurrent resolution
provision of the War Powers Resolution.7
Because the concurrent resolution provision of the War Powers Resolution al-
lows Congress to act by unilateral resolution without presentment to the President for
approval or veto, it resembles the provision held unconstitutional in Chadha. How-
ever, it is not for that reason unconstitutional on its face. Since the Constitution
entrusts to Congress the power to declare war,8 the separation of powers arguments
invoked by the Court in Chadha to invalidate the legislative veto apply with equal
force to presidential warmaking. If presidential authority to make war is to exist
under the Constitution, that authority cannot go unchecked. Logically, Congress, as
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982). The concurrent resolution provision is § 1544(c).
3. See, e.g., United States Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., I st Sess. 2-3 (1983) (statement of Stanley H. Brand, Gen. Counsel to the Clerk,
House of Representatives); President Nixon's Message Vetoing the War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COmP. PREs.
Doc. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973); Tolchin, House Aide Suggests Broader Impact of Court's Veto Ruling, N.Y. Times, June 29,
1983, at A19, cal. 1.
4. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
5. The term "legislative veto" or "congressional veto" refers to unilateral disapproval by one or both houses of
Congress of an action taken by the President or an executive or independent agency. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764,
2771 n.2 (1983).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982); see INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983).
7. See supra note 3; Lungren & Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 767 (1984); INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 n. 1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (citing the War
Powers Resolution as an example of legislative veto provisions probably struck down by the majority opinion). But see
Ratner & Cole, The Force of La.w: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 715, 738
n.99 (1984).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 11.
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the primary warmaking body, should have power to review executive warmaking.
This Comment will argue that in certain situations a legislative veto is a con-
stitutionally permissible check on presidential warmaking power.
Presidential authority to make war may derive from several sources. 9 Whether
Congress may exercise control over an act of presidential warmaking depends on the
constitutional basis of the presidential power being exercised. Each invocation of the
concurrent resolution provision must therefore be analyzed to determine whether the
balance of separation of powers considerations permits the legislative veto.
This Comment will begin with an analysis of the scope of the Chadha decision.
Next, potential sources of presidential warmaking power will be identified and dis-
cussed. Finally, the situations in which invocation of the concurrent resolution provi-
sion may be constitutional will be examined.
II. THE Chadha OPINION
At issue in INS v. Chadha was a section of the Immigration and Nationality
Act' ° that authorized either house of Congress to overturn, by resolution, orders of
the Attorney General suspending deportation of certain aliens." The Court held that
the legislative veto violated both the bicameralism and presentment requirements' 2 of
the Constitution. 13 Since the War Powers Resolution requires a concurrent resolution
of both houses to terminate hostilities, bicameralism is not an issue in this Comment,
and the portion of the Chadha decision concerning bicameralism will not be dis-
cussed except insofar as it bears on the remainder of the Court's analysis.
The Chadha Court began its discussion by quoting the relevant portions of the
Constitution.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States....
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be re-
passed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.'
According to the Court, "[T]hese provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers."' 5 Thus, the Court's analysis
9. See infra notes 35-145 and accompanying text.
10. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
11. Id. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
12. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § I (bicameralism); id. § 7, cl. 2 (bicameralism and presentment); id. § 7, cl. 3 (present-
ment).
13. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2787 (1983).
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
15. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983).
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hinged on the separation of powers, and specifically on the importance of checks on
legislative power.
The Court stated that presentment of proposed legislation to the President for
approval or veto serves three purposes. First, it gives to the President "'a con-
stitutional and effectual power of self-defense.' - 1 6 Second, it protects the public
against "oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures."' 17 Last, it "assure[s]
that a 'national' perspective is grafted on the legislative process,"' 8 since the Presi-
dent is elected by all the people. According to the Court, these considerations were
thought by the Framers to be "imperative."'19 The separation of powers was in-
corporated into the Constitution "to assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of
government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure
inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,
even to accomplish some desirable objective, must be resisted.''2 The Court con-
cluded that every congressional act having a legislative character and effect must be
presented for presidential veto unless specifically exempted from presentment by the
Constitution. z1
Turning to the specific facts of Chadha, the Court determined that the legislative
veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act was a legislative act, using the following
analysis. The Court began with a presumption that any action of Congress is a
legislative act. 22 The Court then examined three characteristics of the legislative veto
in question and found that they supported, rather than rebutted, that presumption.
First, "[i]n purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 to 'establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization,' the House took action that had the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the
legislative branch." 2 3 Second, the veto provision was a substitute for clearly legisla-
tive action, since ordinarily Congress may intervene in the residency status of aliens
only by private bill, if at all. 24 Without the challenged provision, Congress would not
have had unilateral power to require Chadha's deportation. Last, the Attorney Gener-
al in suspending Chadha's deportation was acting pursuant to a delegation of legisla-
tive power. Any alteration or revocation of a delegation of authority must be accom-
plished by legislative action subject to bicameralism and presentment. 25 The Court,
having concluded that the legislative veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act was
a legislative act, held the veto unconstitutional 26 because it did not fall within any of
the constitutional provisions allowing action by one house without presentment for
veto.
27
16. Id. at 2782 (quoting TIE FEDERAUST No. 73, at 458 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
17. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (1983).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2784.
21. Id. at 2784, 2786-87.
22. Id. at 2784.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2785 & n.17.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2788.
27. Id. at 2786-87.
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The Court's analysis in Chadha appears to invalidate virtually every use of the
legislative veto. Nevertheless, the constitutional allocation of the war powers is
unique because Congress has sole (or at least primary) 28 power to prepare for and
initiate 29 a war which only the President can conduct. 30 The Chadha decision, which
applied to a legislative veto of executive action taken pursuant to an express delega-
tion of Congress' power, should not apply when the executive action sought to be
vetoed derives from a source of power shared with Congress. 31
The Chadha Court based its decision on the concept of separation of powers,
holding that the legislative veto in that case avoided constitutionally mandated checks
and balances. The War Powers Resolution, on the other hand, created a procedural
framework for presidential warmaking designed to prevent the President from avoid-
ing constitutional checks and balances and to restore to Congress its proper share of
the war power. 32 If the presidential warmaking sought to be vetoed is subject to
congressional approval as a matter of constitutional law, 33 denial of legislative
approval is not a legislative act of the sort contemplated in Chadha. Additionally,
since separation of powers considerations would counsel against allowing the Presi-
dent to veto Congress' disapproval of a presidential act that is constitutionally subject
to congressional approval, the Chadha analysis may be inapplicable. To determine
when congressional approval of presidential warmaking is required, it is necessary to
examine the constitutional bases for presidential warmaking power.
III. SOURCES OF PRESIDENTIAL WARMAKING POWER
Seven sources of presidential warmaking power can be identified. The sources,
which will be defined and discussed in this section, are (1) a congressional declara-
28. This Comment will not attempt to define the elusive point at which presidential prerogative must give way to
legislative authority in the area of initiating combat. For recent explorations of that subject, see E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED
WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1982); W.T. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? (1981); A. VAN W. THONIAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE
WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS (1982); Friedman,
Waging War Against Checks and Balances-The Claim of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
213 (1983).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
30. Id. art. 1n, § 2, cl. 1. Perhaps in no other area is the division of powers either as ambiguous or as controversial.
See supra note 28.
31. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781, 2785 n. 16 (1983) (suggesting that the Court's attention was directed
exclusively toward legislative vetoes over actions pursuant to delegated power).
32. Most proposed versions of the War Powers Resolution outlined substantive divisions of the war power as well.
See, e.g., S. 1880, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971) (Bentsen version); S.J. Res. 59, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-3 (1971)
(Eagleton version); H.R. 18,137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § l(a) (1970) (Quie version); H. Con. Res. 199, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970) (Podell version). The bill finally enacted states in its statement of purpose and policy that
Itlhe constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or(3)
a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982). Yet a later section of the Resolution recites that "[niothing in this chapter ... is intended to
alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President." Id. § 1547(d). In any case, it is doubtful that
§ 1541(c) has any operative effect. See W.T. REVELEY, supra note 28, at 237, and sources cited therein. For discussions
of the need for war powers legislation, see War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 407-09 (1971) (statement of Sen. Horton); Congress, the President, and the War Powers:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 270-71 (1970) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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tion of war; (2) other express statutory delegation of war power; (3) implied delega-
tion of authority; (4) inherent presidential power; (5) "assumed authorization"-
presidential power to exercise legislative authority in an emergency on the assump-
tion that Congress would approve if time permitted it to meet; (6) treaty obligations;
and (7) no source (unconstitutional action).
A. Declarations of War and Express Delegations
The concurrent resolution provision is by its own terms inapplicable when pres-
idential war power is exercised pursuant to a "declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization." 34 Specific statutory authorization exists when a statute "specifically
authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or in-
to . situations [wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances] and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of" the War Powers Resolution. 3
5
Congress clearly may not retain a veto over delegated warmaking power merely
by omitting any reference to the War Powers Resolution in the authorizing statute, in
an attempt to avoid the exception in the concurrent resolution provision. If Congress
expressly delegated war power to the President, yet attempted to retain a unilateral
veto over the exercise of that power, the veto would be indistinguishable from the one
struck down in Chadha. It would amount to an amendment or repeal of the delegating
statute by unilateral congressional action. 3
6
Of course, if a President purports to act pursuant to an invalid delegation,
another source of power must be found to legitimate the action. However, there are
few limits on Congress' authority to delegate its constitutional powers. In the only
cases in which delegations of legislative authority have been invalidated-Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan37 and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States3 8-the Court
pointed to the absence of any standard by which the delegate could be held account-
able in its exercise of delegated power. 39 In the area of foreign relations, the Court
has upheld broad delegations of power to the President, stating that there are few
constraints on Congress' authority to delegate power to a delegate that already has
independent authority over the subject matter of the delegation. 4 However, it is
unlikely that an authorization enabling the President to initiate war whenever he or
she sees fit would be upheld. Because of the Framers' strong belief that entering war
should be a considered decision, 4 and because of the requirement that a delegation of
power contain some standards governing its exercise, 42 a statutory delegation of
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982).
35. Id. § 1547(a)(I).
36. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2780-83, 2785 & n.18 (1983).
37. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
38. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
39. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935); see Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935).
40. United States v. Curtiss-Vright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936); see also United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975).
41. See infra note 61.
42. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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warmaking power should specify at a minimum either the nation or nations against
which the President is authorized to wage war or the actions by a foreign country that
will provoke a military response.
B. Implied Delegations of Legislative Power
Implied delegations of congressional war power have been found most often (if
not only) in cases of ambiguous congressional ratifications of prior unauthorized
executive action. Implied prospective delegation closely resembles assumed au-
thorization, which will be discussed later in this Comment.4 3
During the Vietnam War era, some courts held that several different types of
congressional action implicitly ratified the President's war initiatives. While some-
times relying additionally on the more explicit Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 44 these
courts found sufficient authorization for the war in military appropriations, selective
service acts, 45 and even the absence of open congressional resistance to the war.46 In
response to the argument that legislators opposed to the war might feel bound by
political constraints, or by duty to soldiers already overseas, to continue military
appropriations, one court stated that "Congressional pusillanimity" did not constrain
the Executive to cease the undeclared war.47
As a result of these judicial inferences of ratification, the War Powers Resolu-
tion was framed to make clear that
[a]uthority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be
inferred ... from any provision of law . . . , including any provision contained in any
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of [the War Powers
Resolution] .48
Commentators 49 and legislators who feared that the War Powers Resolution was
too weak50 have suggested that the Resolution itself implicitly delegates to the Presi-
dent the authority to initiate war as he or she pleases, provided the procedural
requirements of the Resolution are met. While this fear may well be justified as a
practical matter, the War Powers Resolution could not be clearer in its refusal to
extend a general grant of warmaking power to the President. Implied delegations, as
distinguished from assumed authorization, are grants of power that arise from in-
43. See infra notes 57-58, 69-92 and accompanying text.
44. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (repealed 1971); see, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
45. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). But see Mitchell
v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
46. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (lst Cir. 1971).
47. Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971).
48. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1982).
49. T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 203 (1974);
W.T. REVELEY, supra note 28, at 360 n.17.
50. 119 CONG. REC. 36,177 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton); id. at 36,204 (statement of Rep. Green); id. at
36,220 (statement of Rep. Dellums); id. at 36,221 (statements of Reps. Abzug and Culver).
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terpretation of a general statute. In the War Powers Resolution Congress has ex-
pressly dictated how its enactments are to be interpreted. Not only does the Resolu-
tion prohibit inferences of authority from statutes that do not specifically authorize
the use of armed forces, but it also emphasizes that it is not to "be construed as
granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had
in the absence of" the Resolution. 5' The War Powers Resolution therefore clearly
precludes the President from initiating war pursuant to an implied delegation of
legislative power.52
C. Inherent Powers and Assumed Authorization
The Framers' intent that the Executive should have power "to repel sudden
attacks" against the United States without waiting for congressional approval has
been universally accepted.5 3 Some commentators have argued that this defensive
power should include the power to send rescuing troops to the aid of United States
citizens and nationals endangered abroad, 54 and at least one court has stated in dicta
that in a "grave emergency" other than actual attack the President may initiate war.
55
The theoretical base of the Executive's defensive powers, however, has rarely
been explored, other than as a vehicle to define the scope of those powers. Some
commentators have proceeded from the idea that the Commander-in-Chief, foreign
relations, and executive powers give the President inherent constitutional authority to
defend the nation. 56 Others have relied on a theory of "assumed authorization" or
implied consent. 57 As the concept has been formulated by these commentators, the
President may initiate United States participation in war only when time precludes
consultation with Congress and the danger to the United States is so great that it is a
"foregone conclusion" that Congress would authorize the war. 58 The theory upon
which presidential powers of defense rest deserves more attention, for it is crucial to
the determination of whether Congress may intervene in presidential warmaking.
It does not appear that the Framers of the Constitution considered this point. The
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1982).
52. It should be noted, however, that if an implied delegation were somehow found to have occurred, presidential
warmaking thereunder would not be subject to congressional veto. Once a statute had been judicially interpreted to
authorize the war, the reasoning of Chadha would apply. Congress could change the statute and its interpretation only by
the normal process of amendment or repeal.
53. 2 M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDS oFrTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318 (rev. ed. 1937) (motion of Messrs.
Madison and Gerry).
54. See, e.g., Emerson, The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51
NOTRE DAME LAW. 187, 191-92 (1975).
55. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
56. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 54, at 195-209.
57. See, e.g., W.T. RavEtgy, supra note 28, at 221; Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70
VA. L. REV. 101, 111 (1984) (citing Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power to Wage War, 48 Cut.-KE r L.
REv. 131, 140-41 (1971)); Friedman, supra note 28, at 220-23; Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit
Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771, 1783 (1968); see also A, VAN W. THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, supra note 28, at
50-51 (discussing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)); cf. Tribe, The Legislative Veto
Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LIEcts. 1, 20 (1984).
58. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 220-23; Note, supra note 57, at 1783.
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congressional war power, originally the power to "make war," was changed to the
power to "declare war," "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
attacks." 5 9 However, no such power was expressly vested in the President. One of
the delegates believed that the President would have the power to "repel and not to
commence war" even if Congress were given the sole power to "make" war, and
that changing "make" to "declare" would "narrow[] the [Congress'] power too
much." 60 Two concerns did surface in both the Constitutional Convention and the
state ratification conventions: a need to protect the new nation's threatened territorial
integrity, and an overpowering desire to avoid another war.6' The Framers believed
that by vesting the exclusive power to initiate war in the Legislature, hasty and
ill-considered decisions could be avoided; yet sufficient power was reserved to the
President to defend against attack.62
The courts have never directly addressed the source of presidential defensive
powers, and the two leading cases dealing with presidential war power-The Brig
Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases)63 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The
Steel Seizure Case)6 4-- superficially appear to be in conflict on the issue.
The Prize Cases challenged President Lincoln's authority to blockade Con-
federate ports without congressional approval. 65 In upholding the President's action
the Court appeared to rely on a broad notion of national self-defense. In much-quoted
language, the Court stated that the President "has no power to initiate or declare a
war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But ... [i]f a war be made by
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist
force by force." 66 Further, the decision of when an invasion or insurrection has
reached proportions requiring defensive action is the President's alone. "He must
determine what degree of force the crisis demands." 67 Clearly, if the President is
"bound" to act,68 the President must have inherent constitutional power sufficient to
execute that duty.
The majority and concurring opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, in contrast,
are among the nation's most ringing denunciations of presidential overreaching. Yet
59. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 53, at 318-19 (motion of Messrs. Madison and Gerry).
60. Id. at 318 (statement of Mr. Sharman).
61. We are still an inviting object to one European power at least, and, if we cannot defend ourselves, the
temptation may become too alluring to be resisted .... This system will not hurry us into war, it is calculated to
guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such
distress, for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large; this declaration must be
made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives. From this circumstance we may draw a certain
conclusion, that nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war.
2 M. JENSEN, TIE DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITION 583 (1976) (statement of James
Wilson in support of ratification by the Pennsylvania Convention); 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 53, at 318-19 (statements
of Messrs. Madison, Gerry, Sharman, Elseworth, and Mason).
62. See supra note 61.
63. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
64. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
65. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 640-43 (1862).
66. Id. at 668.
67. Id. at 670.
68. Id. at 668-69.
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the Justices were in substantial disagreement over the degree to which presidential
emergency powers should be restricted. Before one can reconcile this case with the
Prize Cases, the seven opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube must be examined to
determine the extent of inherent presidential power.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube arose out of a protracted labor dispute in the steel
industry during the Korean War. On the eve of a strike that would have shut down
steel production in the United States, President Truman issued an executive order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the mills and keep them running. The
steel companies sued to enjoin enforcement of the order. 6 9
The government claimed that the aggregate of the President's powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces provided sufficient author-
ity for the seizure.7 ° The majority opinion, joined by five Justices, simply ignored
this contention and considered separately each potential source of power7' in uphold-
ing the district court's injunction.
The Court summarily rejected the Commander-in-Chief power as a source of
presidential authority to issue the order. According to the Court, the cases cited by the
government in support of this source of power held only that the Commander-in-
Chief power conferred broad authority to conduct "day-to-day fighting in [an already
existing] theater of war."7 The Court also rejected the executive power as a source
of authority, stating that the power weakened rather than strengthened the claim to
implied powers. "In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker ...
[T]he Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which
the President is to execute." '73 The majority opinion thus placed strict limits on
inherent presidential power.
A clear delineation between assumed authorization (although not denominated
as such) and inherent presidential power arises from the remaining opinions. This
distinction appears in the opinions of seven Justices, including the three-Justice
dissent. Four concurring Justices emphasized Congress' earlier refusal to delegate
seizure power to the President.74 That refusal is without significance unless some
type of assumed authorization is contemplated. If the challenged action lies within the
President's inherent powers, no act of Congress can contract that power. Conversely,
if the power were Congress' alone, it is irrelevant whether Congress considered
delegating it provided it was not actually delegated. The dissenters shared the major-
ity's conception of inherent presidential powers, and disagreed with the majority only
on the proper interpretation of Congressional intent. The dissenters argued that the
69. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952).
70. Id. at 587.
71. Id. at 587-88. This is significant in that presidential warmaking has sometimes been justified as an exercise of
the aggregate of Commander-in-Chief, foreign relations, and executive powers. See A. VAN W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS,
supra note 28, at 70-73.
72. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
73. Id. at 587.
74. Id. at 598-603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 656-59 (Burton, J.,
concurring); id. at 662-66 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment).
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President's seizure of the mills was merely an execution of the broad, declared
legislative policies of providing for the national defense and controlling prices. 75 The
dissent also emphasized that the President's message to Congress the day after the
seizure stated that Congress was free to invalidate the order.76 Further, the dissenters
believed that in an emergency which threatens the existence of the nation, the Presi-
dent has the power, albeit limited, to preserve the status quo by any means necessary
until Congress can act. 77
We do not now have before us the case of a President acting solely on the basis of his own
notions of the public welfare. Nor is there any question of unlimited executive power in
this case. The President himself closed the door to any such claim when he sent his
Message to Congress stating his purpose to abide by any action of Congress, whether
approving or disapproving his seizure action. Here, the President immediately made sure
that Congress was fully informed of the temporary action he had taken only to preserve the
legislative programs from destruction until Congress could act. 78
The Youngstown Sheet & Tube opinions do not delimit the concept of assumed
authorization of presidential power as narrowly as commentators who assert that the
power exists only when congressional approval obviously would have been given.
79
Only Justice Frankfurter's opinion can be interpreted as going so far, and it is
uncertain whether that was his intention.
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language and to say that
Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred, where Congress has not ad-
dressed itself to a specific situation. It is quite impossible, however, when Congress did
specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of seizure, to find secreted
in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power which Congress consciously
withheld.80
Justice Frankfurter referred to the President's authority as the power to do what
"Congress would have explicitly written" had it had time-a formulation that resem-
bles some modem commentators' view of assumed authorization. 8 1 However, in an
earlier passage, Justice Frankfurter suggested that certain "authority belongs to [the
President] until Congress acts.",82 It is most likely this broader power that Justice
Frankfurter contrasted with authority that Congress has "consciously withheld."
Justice Jackson's opinion more clearly defined the sources of presidential pow-
er. He described three categories of presidential action. First, "[w]hen the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
75. Id. at 672, 701-04, 709-10 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 667-77, 709-10.
77. The Framers did not "create an automaton [of a President] impotent to exercise the powers of Government at a
time when the survival of the Republic itself may be at stake.... [T]he Executive has the duty to do that which will
preserve peace until Congress acts." Id. at 682, 684.
78. Id. at 701.
79. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
81. See supra note 58.
82. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (Frankfurter, I., concurring).
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can delegate.' '83 Second, presidential actions in areas in which Congress has not
spoken may rest on the President's inherent power or on power within a "zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. "84 Last, "[w]hen the President takes measures incompat-
ible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter." 85
Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight" included only matters to which Congress
has not spoken.8 6 Any congressional action would remove the presidential authority
to either the first category or the third.8 7 If Congress disapproves the presidential
action, the President is deprived of all authority that he or she shares with Congress
and might have exercised absent congressional action. In this situation, the President
"can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter.''88 In Justice Jackson's view, then, Congress has the
final authority over matters in which its power is shared with the President. The
President may constitutionally exercise those powers without legislative approval,
but only if Congress does not expressly or implicitly disapprove the presidential
action.
The opinions of Justices Burton and Clark develop a similar concept of assumed
authorization. In Justice Burton's view, Congress' considered denial of the seizure
power to the President "distinguish[es] this emergency from one in which Congress
takes no action and outlines no governmental policy." 8 9 Justice Clark concluded that
where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confront-
ing the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis; but ... in the
absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent power to act depends
upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation. 90
The dissenters' chief disagreement with the majority and concurring opinions
concerned the interpretation of congressional will, and not the theoretical bounds of
presidential power. In contrast with the majority's emphasis on the legislative history
in which Congress had rejected giving seizure power to the President, the dissent
emphasized the broad legislative programs of providing for defense and controlling
prices. 9 1 The dissent implicitly assumed that express legislative policies must take
precedence over a silent congressional refusal of power. The dissent's view of
assumed authorization may even have been narrower than that of some of the con-
curring Justices, for the dissenters stated only that, "at a time when the survival of
83. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 637.
85. Id. at 637-38.
86. See id. at 637, 639.
87. This was the situation in Youngstown Sheet & Tube. The President's seizure power was "clearly eliminated"
from the zone of twilight by Congress' having spoken to the matter. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment).
91. Id. at 672, 701-04, 709-10 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
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the Republic itself may be at stake .... the Executive has the duty [and therefore the
power] to do that which will preserve peace until Congress acts.''92
None of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube opinions would extend the inherent
powers of the President beyond the express language of the Constitution plus a
possible power of territorial self-defense. 93 Three of the opinions cautioned against
accretions of power, no matter how slight, in any branch of the government.94 The
dissent's repeated assertions that the President was merely preserving legislative
programs until the Legislature could act indicate that those three Justices were also
unwilling to expand inherent presidential powers. 95
One potential source of inherent presidential warmaking power, not at issue in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, remains: the power to conduct foreign relations. The
constitutional provisions giving the President sole power (subject to Senate approval)
to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, 96 together with the inherent power of any
nation to conduct foreign relations,9 7 are generally regarded as rendering the Presi-
dent "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations." 98 Commentators have relied on the broad language of United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.99 for the proposition that warmaking power is included
within the President's powers of international relations.' 0 0
However, nothing in Curtiss-Wright would authorize the President to go to war
without congressional approval. While the Court held that the government's powers
in external affairs were not limited to powers expressly granted by the Con-
stitution, 10 ' it emphasized that inherent foreign relations powers, "like every other
92. Id. at 682, 684.
93. Does the President, in such a situation, have inherent constitutional power to seize private property which
makes congressional action in relation thereto unnecessary? We find no such power available to him under the
present circumstances. The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened
attack. We do not face the issue of what might be the President's constitutional power to meet such catastrophic
situations.
Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring). "ITihe emergency did not create power; it merely marked an occasion when power
should be exercised. And the fact that it was necessary that measures be taken to keep steel in production does not mean
that the President, rather than the Congress, had the constitutional authority to act." Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See also id. at 649-51 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 587-88 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 633-34 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 593-94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (The Framers "rested the
structure of our central government on the system of checks and balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers
was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity... . The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come,
however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority."); id. at 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The appeal, however, that we declare the
existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although
it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected
that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies. Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in time of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety may require it, they made no express provision for exercise
of extraordinary authority because of a crisis. I do not think we rightfully may so amend their work . ) (footnotes
omitted).
95. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
96. U.S. CONS. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
97. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
98. Id. at 320.
99. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
100. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 54, at 202.
101. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions
of the Constitution." o2 As Justice Jackson pointed out in Youngstown Sheet & Tube,
"Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only
to Congress. " 03 The constitutional scheme of separation of powers makes it clear
that a power is not vested in the Executive merely because it is a natural attribute of
sovereignty. 'o' The same inherent powers of government relied on in Curtiss-Wright
to support the President's foreign relations power were cited in another case 0 5
to uphold Congress' power to deprive persons of citizenship.106 The inherent power
of the government to conduct international relations does not vest in the President the
power to declare war. In the absence of contrary expressions by the courts or the
Framers, there is no justification for altering the divisions of power created by the
express language of the Constitution. 107
The Prize Cases are thus reconcilable with Youngstown Sheet & Tube. The
holding of the Prize Cases was limited to a presidential power to "resist force by
force"' 0 8 in the case of an attack on United States soil. In any other situation, the
President "has no [inherent] power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign
nation or a domestic State."' 0 9 Nor is either of these cases inconsistent with later
judicial assertions that "in a grave emergency [the President] may, without Con-
gressional approval, take the initiative to wage war." "0 Depending on the nature of
the emergency, the President may act pursuant to inherent defensive power or
assumed authorization. The Prize Cases control when inherent defensive power is
exercised, while Youngstown Sheet & Tube governs all other assertions of pres-
idential warmaking power.
It is helpful to identify the constitutional language that permits the President to
defend the territorial integrity of the United States. The government has a con-
stitutional duty to "protect each [state] against Invasion." ' " I It is natural, then, that
the Executive should have inherent power to do so; since self-defense is con-
stitutionally required, no congressional approval is necessary. 1 In any situation
other than actual or imminent invasion of United States territory by foreign or
102. Id. at 320.
103. 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 587 (majority opinion); id. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring).
105. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
106. Compare id. at 52 (quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915)), with United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936) (quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)).
107. Though it has been argued that past failures of Congress to repudiate presidential warmaking constitute
authority for a broad interpretation of presidential powers, see Emerson, supra note 54, at 200-01; U.S. Dep't of State,
Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 173 (1950), the majority opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube pointed out that while practice may serve as a guide to interpretation, it cannot overrule express
constitutional language. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952); see also id. at 610
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Professor Friedman argues persuasively that past inaction of Congress shows no intent to
cede power to the President and should not be construed as doing so. Friedman, supra note 28, at 237-45. Furthermore,
Chadha itself struck down a device that had been employed by Congress for 50 years. See Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314,
§ 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414 (repealed 1966) (the first legislative veto). The Chadha Court emphasized that habituation is not
the same as constitutionality. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 n.13 (1983).
108. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
109. Id.
110. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dicta).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
112. See 2 M. FARtasNo, supra note 53, at 318 (statement of Mr. Sharman).
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rebellious domestic forces, no language in the Constitution, the cases, or the debates
at the Constitutional Convention supports an inherent constitutional authority for the
President to initiate war. As Alexander Hamilton stated, "it belongs to Congress only
to go to war" even when the United States or its citizens have received "provocations
or injuries" short of actual or threatened attack. 113 If the President may go to war in
the absence of actual or imminent invasion, " 4 the only power available to her or him
is assumed congressional authorization.
1. Legislative Response to Exercise of Inherent Presidential War Power
Before considering whether a legislative veto over presidential warmaking com-
menced pursuant to inherent powers may be constitutional, it must be determined
whether Congress has any constitutional power to review such actions. When foreign
invaders have reached United States soil, it is apparent that Congress has no such
power, for the Congress, no less than the President, is bound by Article IV's guaran-
tee of protection to the States. 115 Should it appear that "surrender is the best way to
save what remains of the country," 1' 6 the surrender must be agreed upon, not by
unilateral resolve of Congress, but in the same manner as all treaties-by the Presi-
dent "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur." 117 Although some commentators have argued that at
least preemptive strikes" 8 are congressionally reviewable (because of the potential
for abuse of presidential discretion in deciding when an invasion is imminent),19
Congress may never intervene in the exercise of the President's inherent powers
whether the question is when to defend or, for example, what strategies to use. 120
The issue remains, however, whether the President's inherent defensive power
permits unlimited warmaking on the theory that war is war, whether commenced by
foreign aggression or by congressional authorization, and therefore it may be pursued
until ended by treaty. 12' Language in the Prize Cases certainly suggests this result.
The President "does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a
113. A. HAMILTON, WORKS 249-50 (H. Lodge 2d ed. 1903), quoted in A. VAN W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMaAS, supra
note 28, at 37.
114. As stated earlier, it is not the aim of this Comment to define the allocation of war powers between the President
and Congress.
115. But see A. VAN W. THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, supra note 28, at 55 (asserting that congressional ratification is
necessary and repudiation is possible even when the President exercises inherent powers in entering war).
116. W.T. REVELEY, supra note 28, at 199.
117. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 53, at 319 (motion of Mr. Butler to give the
power to make peace to the whole Congress; statement of Mr. Gerry, seconding the motion that the whole Congress is less
likely than the Senate alone to "be corrupted by an Enemy" and "consequently give up part of the U. States").
118. I.e., military action to forestall an imminent attack, as opposed to repulsion of an actual attack.
119. A. VAN W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, supra note 28, at 55-56; Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Con-
stitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1285-86 (1969).
120. Professor Reveley cites the congressional repudiation of the Mexican War as precedent for the reviewability of
preemptive strikes. Reveley, supra note 119, at 1260 & n.48. But, as another commentator points out, Congress ratified
and authorized the war during its course, and only stated that it was "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun" in an
amendment to a resolution of thanks to General Taylor. Note, supra note 57, at 1780 & n.50.
121. See Note, supra note 57, at 1779-81 (arguing that the Prize Cases in addition to the Mexican War dictate this
result).
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foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although
the declaration of it be 'unilateral.' - 122 However, in that case the Court limited its
statements of presidential authority to the power to defend. The President may and
must "resist force by force" 12 3 and "meet [the war] in the shape it present[s]
itself." 2 4 The power to declare war still rests with Congress; the President's inherent
authority is limited to the constitutional duty to protect the states from attack.
Unfortunately, under this analysis the difficult factual determination of when
invasion is no longer imminent must be made. Once the attacking forces have been
subdued to the point that invasion is no longer a serious threat, the President's
defensive authority is at an end. Any further retaliation must be authorized by Con-
gress. 125 Yet the President has discretion to determine whether a foreign or internal
threat is great enough to warrant military response. 126 This proposition follows from
the necessity for instantaneous action. Allowing the President to respond to imminent
invasion, yet first requiring a factual finding by Congress that invasion is truly
imminent, would be anomalous.
After an initial attack has been repulsed, however, Congress will have had time
to meet and decide whether further measures are appropriate. 127 Should Congress
then be able to issue findings of fact, which are binding on the President, as to the
imminence of the threat? Generally, the Framers' desire to avoid war should create a
presumption in favor of congressional action. Here, however, the equally weighty
fear of invasion balances the scales. When a bona fide factual disagreement between
the President and Congress exists, more than a concurrent resolution should be
required to force the President to cease allegedly defensive actions. The President
deserves deference because of his or her foreign policy powers and ultimate
responsibility, as Commander-in-Chief, to defend the nation against attack. For this
reason, if a President in good faith has exercised defensive powers to forestall or repel
an attack, and continues to believe that an attack against the United States is seriously
threatened, a bill subject to presidential veto and accompanied by findings that such
an attack is not in fact imminent should be required to terminate presidential warmak-
ing.
2. Legislative Response to Presidential Warmaking
under Assumed Authorization
As discussed above, assumed authorization exists when the President, although
lacking inherent or delegated war powers, may take any action not inconsistent with
the expressed (or possibly implied) will of Congress to preserve order until Congress
122. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 669.
125. Cf. Congress' exclusive power to grant letters of marque and reprisal. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. In certain
situations (an unlikely example is an invasion of all of North America that continues against Canada and Mexico after
having been defeated in the United States), the President may be able to invoke assumed authorization until Congress acts,
even when the threat of actual invasion of the United States is no longer imminent.
126. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862); Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv. 101, 121 (1984) (citing Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827)).
127. For example, Congress was able to declare war on Japan within one day of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Joint
Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795.
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can meet. 128 Since the President is not exercising inherent power, Congress is not
constitutionally precluded from ending United States participation in the hostilities in
this context. The issue under consideration in this Comment is whether Congress may
do so by concurrent resolution, or whether it must use normal legislative procedures.
To answer this question, the test of INS v. Chadha must be applied: Is the concurrent
resolution a legislative act?
The analysis must begin, as the Chadha Court's did, with the presumption that
any action taken by Congress is a legislative act. 129 Although the Court in Chadha
did not enunciate standards for overcoming this presumption, it is helpful to consider
the three aspects of the legislative veto the Court found persuasive in Chadha.
First, does the concurrent resolution have "the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties and relations of persons ... outside the legislative branch?"
130
In the broadest sense, the resolution obviously has that purpose and effect. In one
stroke, it revokes the status of the United States as a belligerent and alters the rights
and duties under both domestic and international law of the hostile nation, the United
States armed forces, and the President. As a matter of constitutional law, however,
the legal rights and duties of these entities were, from the beginning, subject to
ratification by Congress and based on assumptions concerning what Congress would
do were it able to act. No action taken by the President can change the constitutional
command that Congress alone has the power to declare war. The legal rights and
duties of all persons entangled in the conflict are the product of necessity, created by
the inability of Congress to convene in time. Once an express utterance of Congress
removes the necessity, the rights and duties either cease to exist or are called into new
being by a declaration of war or similar act.
Second, is the character of the congressional action supplanted by the concurrent
resolution such that Congress could terminate United States participation in the
hostilities by concurrent resolution in the absence of the provision?' 3 1 The answer to
this question is similar to the previous one. Since presidential warmaking under
assumed authorization is subject to the will of Congress as a matter of constitutional
law, Congress has inherent power to terminate any such military action without
presidential approval. The War Powers Resolution merely provides a procedural
framework within which Congress can act to disapprove the war.
Last, was the President's warmaking power delegated to him or her by Con-
gress? 132 Obviously it was not, and this is the key to the constitutionality of the
concurrent resolution. The President, in initiating war without inherent power to do
so, is exercising a power that the Constitution gives exclusively to Congress, without
the authority of a legislative delegation. As Professor Reveley points out, the legisla-
tive process "runs in reverse"' 33 when authorization is assumed. Necessity confers
on the Executive the power to act before congressional approval is obtained; yet
128. See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
129. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784 (1983).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2785.
132. Id. at 2786.
133. W.T. REVELEY, supra note 28, at 198.
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necessity does not write statutes that can be repealed only by act of Congress subject
to presidential veto. The requirement that Congress must declare war is not forever
abandoned merely because Congress was unable to gather before the President
thought action necessary.
Apart from the criteria discussed in Chadha, it is clear that a congressional veto
of assumed presidential warmaking authority is an extraordinary act. Rather than
acting to create new legislation, Congress is dispelling an assumption that legislation
was intended by Congress. Necessity permits the President to act without prior
approval, but necessity does not suspend the Constitution. The separation of powers
considerations that the Court found compelling in Chadha are doubly implicated
when an emergency allows the President to exercise a power that the Constitution
commits to Congress alone. As the Court declared in Chadha, "The hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." 134 "With all the
obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a
better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." 135 As Justice Jackson
stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, "emergency powers are consistent with free
government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who
exercises them." 136 If assumed presidential authority to make war could be revoked
only by statute, the President could initiate war at any time with the support of only
thirty-four people (one-third of the Senate to block override of a veto). 137 In order to
preserve the separation of powers, presidential warmaking, when exercised pursuant
to assumed authorization, must remain subject to the exclusive power of Congress to
declare or refuse to declare war. When the President claims assumed congressional
authorization to initiate war, the concurrent resolution provision is constitutional.138
D. Treaty Obligations
International agreements obligating the United States to go to war upon the
happening of some event (typically an attack against another of the signatories)
provide a final potential source of presidential warmaking power. Commentators
have argued that treaties of this kind do not obviate the constitutional requirement of a
congressional declaration of war, 139 and the case law seems to support this result. 140
In general, treaties are self-executing whenever self-execution is "the intent of
the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the
134. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784 (1983).
135. Id. at 2788.
136. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
137. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 244 n.87.
138. It is irrelevant that, as some commentators have argued, legislative overreaching is as much to be feared as
usurpations by the Executive. See, e.g., Lungren & Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision, 17
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 767, 779-80 (1984). This is, of course, true. The checks and balances in the Constitution reflect the
Framers' general fear of any branch's growing too powerful. However, it can hardly be called "overreaching" for one
branch to respond to another branch's usurpation of its constitutional power.
139. A. VAN W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, supra note 28, at 81; Note, supra note 57, at 1798-99.
140. See infra notes 141-44.
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instrument is uncertain, recourse must be had to the circumstances surrounding its
execution. "141 However, treaties and statutes are accorded an identical level of
deference by the courts, so that if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent the one
ratified later in time controls to the extent of the inconsistency.' 42 Most importantly,
it has been repeatedly held that treaty obligations are in all respects subordinate to the
requirements of the Constitution. ' 43 Insofar as war power is allocated by the Con-
stitution, therefore, treaties do not supply an independent source of presidential
warmaking power.
It might be argued that treaty obligations create an opportunity for the exercise
of assumed authorization. Congress has precluded this result, however, in the War
Powers Resolution. "Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances shall not be inferred . . . from any treaty heretofore or hereafter rati-
fied unless such treaty is implemented by [specific statutory authorization]."' 44
Thus, treaties obligating the United States to go to war must be implemented by
legislation and do not authorize the President to act without congressional approval.
E. Unconstitutional Action
If a President's warmaking is without constitutional basis, may Congress ter-
minate the war by concurrent resolution? The analysis is quite similar to that applied
to presidential warmaking under assumed authorization. In this instance, the resolu-
tion would not have the intent or effect of altering legal rights or duties of persons
outside the legislative branch. The President has no legal right to conduct the war,
and the resolution merely determines the duties of persons subordinate to both the
President and the Constitution. 1'4 5 In the absence of the concurrent resolution provi-
sion, Congress could certainly terminate United States participation in the hostilities
by concurrent resolution. Such a move would be equivalent to express denial of the
ratification that is necessary to constitutionalize the President's action. Again, since
the President has already usurped congressional powers, the legislative process runs
in reverse, and Congress must exercise a veto over the President's actions in order to
preserve its exclusive power to declare war. Finally, the President is not acting
pursuant to any delegation of power; no congressional act must be amended or
repealed in order to deny the Executive's warmaking power. The separation of
powers is implicated most strongly when the President has no basis on which to
exercise Congress' power to declare war. Together, these factors would certainly
overcome the presumption that the veto is an ordinary legislative act.
141. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
142. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality
opinion).
143. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (plurality opinion); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890);
Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 207-08
(1926).
144. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1982).
145. See Ratner & Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 715, 739 n.99 (1984).
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Concurrent resolution may in fact be the best means by which Congress can stop
executive overreaching in the war powers arena. Impeachment is slow, cumbersome,
and politically sensitive; wholesale suspension of defense appropriations is not only
politically untenable, but might leave the nation vulnerable to an actual attack. 1
4 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha is not so broad that all potential
invocations of the concurrent resolution provision of the War Powers Resolution are
invalidated. The President's war powers are unique among all the constitutionally
delegated powers in that they spring from a variety of interrelated sources. The
President's inherent warmaking authority, however, is limited to the defense of the
territorial integrity of the United States. In other situations, when Congress has not
spoken or is unable to act, presidential authority to initiate war may be assumed.
Because of the importance of Congress' role in declaring war and the need for a check
on presidential power, if the President acts unconstitutionally or pursuant to assumed
authorization, Congress may constitutionally exercise control, not subject to veto,
over a presidential decision to go to war.'
47
Susan J. Haas
146. The Court suggested in Chadha that even when the action sought to be vetoed exceeds delegated power, it can
be challenged only through judicial review and not by congressional veto. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16
(1983). However, this is true only when the executive or independent agency purports to act pursuant to a delegation of
legislative power. When separation of powers is in question, the courts are precluded by the political question doctrine
from reviewing the executive action before Congress has declared the action unauthorized. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
147. The reasoning of this Comment would also apply to the automatic termination provision of the War Powers
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982). This section requires the President to terminate the use of United States armed
forces after 60 days "unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization ... (2) has
extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet." When a President acts pursuant to assumed
authorization, this section simply indicates when authorization can no longer be assumed. It is not congressional inaction
after the use of armed forces that acts as a constraint on the President; rather, the section is a prior statutory guide to
interpretation of Congress' actions. (Recall that in Youngstown Sheet & Tube it was Congress' refusal to act in the past that
was deemed a denial of authorization. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.) When the President acts un-
constitutionally, the automatic termination provision avoids a political question stalemate by indicating to the courts
Congress' refusal to ratify the action.

